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Abstract 
Reports of rare patients who seem to lack the ability to retain certain types of 
information across brief delays have long sustained the popular idea that newly-
perceived verbal, visual, and spatial information is initially recorded in separate, 
specialized short-term memory buffers. However, evidence from these same cases 
includes puzzling details that question explanations based on isolated deficits to a 
specialized storage system. We highlight consistent findings from patients with deficient 
auditory short-term memory that warrant further investigation and may challenge the 
specialized store account, including that short-term recognition memory performance 
appears to be much stronger than recall, and not so obviously impaired. We also 
describe the substantial problems for the broader memory system caused by assuming 
that the patients’ deficits are focused in a specialized module. We suggest that a sensory-
motor integration account of the patient cases may adequately explain these patterns, 
and therefore presents a path toward incorporating into the embedded processes 
framework greater clarity about how domain-specific phenomena in immediate memory 
tasks arise. We further contend that applying ideas about sensory-motor recruitment 
could improve working memory theory.       
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Sensory-motor integration and brain lesions: Progress toward explaining domain-
specific phenomena within domain-general working memory  
 
One of the biggest tensions between models of working memory arises from how 
best to explain the robust and consistent modality- and domain-specific phenomena 
observed in working memory tasks. Performing two tasks that both depend on verbal 
representations or that both depend on visual-spatial representations results in poorer 
performance than performing two tasks relying on a mixture of representations (e.g., 
Fougnie & Marois, 2011; Fougnie, Zughni, Godwin, & Marois, 2015; Logie, Zucco, & 
Baddeley, 1990; Thalmann & Oberauer, 2017). At the same time, there also appears to 
be a general limit that applies regardless of representation domain (Cowan, 2001; 
Cowan & Morey, 2007; Cowan, Saults, & Blume, 2014; Saults & Cowan, 2007; 
Vergauwe, Barrouillet, & Camos, 2010), which is incompatible with a simplistic model 
(which perhaps nobody endorses) in which there is one store for aural-verbal materials 
and a completely separate store for visual-spatial materials. It is clear that a model of 
working memory must be able to explain within-domain interference, but the multiple 
ways of accounting for this interference must be assessed. Some models claim to 
account for both within-domain interference in working memory and across-domain 
capacity limits without postulating the existence of domain-specific stores (Cowan, 
2005; Cowan, 1988; Oberauer, 2013), but specialized short-term memory stores remain 
a prominent feature of many popular theories (Baddeley, 2012; Logie, 2011). We 
consider whether evidence from patients with selective impairments on certain kinds of 
short-term memory tasks adjudicate between these classes of working memory model. 
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Special attention must be given to evidence from brain lesions, which has been 
important in developing models of working memory that include specialized short-term 
storage. Theorists favoring the existence of domain-specific stores (e.g., Baddeley, 2012; 
Logie, 2011) rely more heavily on patient lesion data to justify postulating these stores, 
whereas theorists who refrain from including domain-specific short-term stores 
sometimes have been accused of ignoring this important source of evidence (but see 
Cowan, 1988, p. 182). Below, we briefly review competing accounts of within-domain 
interference and then re-examine these crucial data from patients with deficits on aural-
verbal short-term memory tasks, considering  how this evidence constrains any model 
that aims to explain short-term memory phenomena. Our re-consideration of evidence 
from the patient cases leads us to question the conclusion that a specialized short-term 
store is deficient in these cases, and to consider how the sensory-motor integration 
account (Buchsbaum et al., 2011; Buchsbaum & D’Esposito, 2008) and sensory-motor 
recruitment explanations of short-term memory more generally (D’Esposito & Postle, 
2015) might be used to better incorporate domain-specific predictions into the domain-
general embedded process working memory model (Cowan, 2005). The sensory-motor 
integration account of these patients is one in which their key neuropsychological deficit 
is in the ability to translate an auditory verbal representation into a motor sequence for 
recall.  
1. Competing accounts of within-domain interference  
The greater amount of interference between items from the same domain (e.g., 
two visual or two verbal items as opposed to one of each) is undeniable but has been 
explained by several different theoretical approaches. Some have assumed that there are 
many kinds of feature-detecting mechanisms in the brain and that representations from 
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the same domain have more neural overlap and therefore interfere more with each other 
than with representations from other domains (e.g., Cowan, 1988; for a development of 
the functional definition of such interference see Oberauer, Farrell, Jarrold, & 
Lewandowsky, 2016). In the embedded processes framework, general costs to holding 
information in the focus of attention arise from the need to periodically maintain the 
activation of long-term memories currently supporting the task (Rhodes & Cowan, 
2018). Others assume that interference takes place not during storage but during 
perception and that short-term memory phenomena are actually byproducts of 
perceptual affordances rather than the structure of a memory system (e.g., Macken, 
Taylor, & Jones, 2015). Similarly, the ability to link sensory representations to motor 
processes has been of interest (Buchsbaum & D’Esposito, 2008; Caplan, Waters, & 
Howard, 2012). One popular view, however, posits specialized mnemonic structures for 
storing or rehearsing representations in different domains separately (e.g., Baddeley, 
2012; Barrouillet & Camos, 2015; Logie, 2011).  
The multiple-component model of working memory (Baddeley, 2012) includes 
both domain-specific and domain-general aspects. The model includes specialized 
stores for verbal and visual-spatial information, and also allows an amodal episodic 
buffer to represent information that cannot be represented elsewhere (such as semantic 
information and binding between visual and verbal features). At first glance, this 
conception seems to provide an adequate account of the consistent empirical findings in 
the short-term memory literature by allowing for both domain-general and domain-
specific representation. However, empirical challenges to the assumption of separate 
stores suggest that alternative accounts should be considered. Findings of common 
limits on temporary storage (C. Morey, Cowan, Morey, & Rouder, 2011; Saults & Cowan, 
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2007; Vergauwe et al., 2010) pose one challenge to this view. If verbal and visuo-spatial 
information could be held separately by two buffers, there should be no interference 
between modalities provided that the perceptual intake of the stimuli is not overloaded, 
and in the above research it has not been (e.g., stimuli in the two domains have been 
presented one at a time). This challenge may possibly be accommodated by the 
assumption of domain-general along with domain-specific storage resources, as 
explicitly introduced by Baddeley (2000). However, it has also been shown that many 
classic patterns consistent with the assumption of an aural-verbal short-term store may 
be attributable to perceptual (e.g., Hughes, Marsh, & Jones, 2009; Jones, Hughes, & 
Macken, 2006) or linguistic phenomena (Jalbert, Neath, Bireta, & Surprenant, 2011; 
Majerus, 2009; Schweppe, Grice, & Rummer, 2011). Such findings directly challenge the 
need to assume specialized storage at all. Interpretation of the neuropsychological 
evidence that injury can lead to a focal impairment in immediately recalling aurally-
presented verbal information is therefore important for determining whether we need to 
assume a specialized phonological short-term memory component. 
2. Interpreting neuropsychological data  
Whenever experimental evidence appears to falsify hypotheses about short-term 
stores, patient cases are brought forward as “smoking-gun evidence” for short-term 
stores, meaning that the evidence points too strongly towards distinct short-term stores 
for a reasonable person to doubt that interpretation, and therefore any apparently 
contradictory experimental evidence should be reconsidered or disregarded (Gathercole, 
1994; Logie, 2011). Neuropsychological evidence thus plays an enormous role in this 
theoretical debate, so it is important to establish whether the characterization of these 
impairments as short-term storage deficits is truly undeniable. Alternative hypotheses 
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suggest instead that the deficits to short-term recall exhibited by these patients might 
arise from selective impairments to the speech production system (Caplan, Waters, & 
Howard, 2012), to rapid and perhaps selective decay of phonological activations within a 
linguistic-semantic network (Martin & Saffran, 1992), or to the ability to link aural 
sensory representations with speech production processes (Buchsbaum & D’Esposito, 
2008). These suggestions, when united with an amodal storage system such as that in 
the embedded processes framework (e.g. Cowan, 2005), might present a plausible 
solution to the tension created by evidence that short-term memory is apparently both 
domain-specific and domain-general. Specifically, as we outline in more detail later, any 
modality-specific benefits and limitations may be inherited by the memory system from 
perceptual and motor systems, whose specificity of function is much less ambiguous, 
while amodal working memory itself imposes further limits that arise during 
performance of immediate memory tasks. Explicitly predicting that memories are 
influenced by the specialized capabilities of modality-specific perceptual and motor 
systems allows a path for an amodal memory system to express further specificity. 
Furthermore, in contrast to positing many distinct temporary memory stores, this route 
to resolving the tension between generality and specificity in working memory has the 
additional benefit of parsimoniously reducing redundancy across interrelated cognitive 
systems.    
 The defining characteristic of the aural-verbal short-term memory deficit is 
poorer performance recalling sequences of verbal materials when the information is 
aurally rather than visually presented. This unusual pattern is striking when compared 
with the performance of healthy controls for several reasons. First, the ability to 
compare recall of the very same memoranda (e.g., lists of digits, letters, words, etc.), 
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differing only by mode of acquisition, is powerful. Second, healthy individuals not only 
show consistently longer memory spans than these patients, but show the reverse 
pattern with respect to modality. The patients’ recall of visually-presented information 
exceeds that of aurally-presented information, whereas typically, recall is superior for 
aurally-presented verbal materials than for written text (Penney, 1989). Furthermore, 
both in patients like KF and PV (Basso, Spinnler, Vallar, & Zanobio, 1982; Warrington & 
Shallice, 1969), who are believed to present with relatively pure aural-verbal short-term 
memory deficits, and in conduction aphasia (which frequently includes aural-verbal 
short-term memory deficits; Buchsbaum et al., 2011; Shallice & Warrington, 1977) more 
broadly, the deficit is not ameliorated by the opportunity to recall via pointing (Tzortzis 
& Albert, 1974; Warrington & Shallice, 1969). This confirms that the problem is not 
restricted to speech specifically, bolstering the view that it has something to do with 
memory. Furthermore, there is also evidence that these patients can learn novel aural-
verbal sequences given sufficient time and repetition, which naturally focuses the deficit 
on recent, immediate memories. Altogether, this evidence has suggested to researchers 
that temporary storage of aurally-presented verbal information is sufficiently 
circumscribed and distinct from other mnemonic and linguistic processes that it may be 
specifically and selectively damaged.  
We evaluate the evidence presented in case reports identified as aural-verbal 
short-term memory impairment and consider whether this evidence is strong enough to 
justify the theoretical weight it bears for multiple-component working memory theories. 
Is it necessary to interpret the case evidence as reflecting specialized short-term 
memory stores, or are the alternative interpretations that implicate sensory-motor 
integration also viable? We conclude that the limited evidence these cases present does 
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not unequivocally demand the supposition of specialized short-term memory stores. 
Considering the limited data available from short-term aural-verbal memory cases, our 
assessment reveals findings that are inconsistent with the argument that these patients 
suffered from a specialized storage deficit. Though we acknowledge that the existing 
neuropsychological evidence does not absolutely rule out the hypothesis that there is a 
specialized short-term store for aural-verbal information, we conclude that the data may 
be interpreted equally well under the sensory-motor integration account. We further 
consider whether assumptions arising from embedded-process style models of working 
memory (Cowan, 2005) can fill apparent gaps left by the view that short-term memory 
phenomena emerge from sensory-motor integration. 
3. Weaknesses in the selective short-term storage account of 
neuropsychological patients   
3.1 Impurity of the cases. Patients KF (Shallice & Warrington, 1970; 
Warrington, Logue, & Pratt, 1971; Warrington & Shallice, 1969), JB (Shallice & 
Butterworth, 1977; Warrington et al., 1971) and PV (Basso et al., 1982; Vallar & 
Baddeley, 1984) took part in a variety of tests, including tests of verbal short-term 
memory administered both aurally and visually with many kinds of verbal materials for 
a range of sequence lengths. These patients are often considered “pure” cases of aural-
verbal short-term memory impairment because much of their language functioning was 
reportedly preserved. Even so, each of the complete case descriptions mentions other 
language disturbances occurring shortly after the injury and gradually improving, which 
is consistent with the conjecture of Buchsbaum and D’Esposito (2008) that these 
patients may have experienced greater facility from the right hemisphere in 
compensating for language dysfunctions, preventing them from presenting as typical 
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conduction aphasics. Furthermore, like conduction aphasics, they each experienced 
some sustained difficulty with word repetition. Patients with conduction aphasia also 
suffer from aural-verbal short-term memory deficit (Kinsbourne, 1972; Shallice & 
Butterworth, 1977; Shallice & Warrington, 1977; Strub & Gardner, 1974; Tzortzis & 
Albert, 1974), and are often considered alongside KF, JB, and PV despite their 
additional symptoms. One interpretation of this is that it is the patients’ aural-verbal 
short-term memory deficit that causes problems with word repetition (Shallice & 
Warrington, 1977), but the reverse could also be true. It is clear that short-term memory 
spans and word processing indicators (e.g., word repetition) correlate strongly in these 
patients, such that patients with longer memory spans show less deficiency in 
phonological processing (Majerus, 2009). We consider the range of evidence presented 
by these patients, placing greatest weight on the data from KF, JB, and PV.  
3.2 Response-based inconsistencies. Despite the consistent immediate 
recall deficits these cases present, some evidence provided within these case 
descriptions poses challenges for the idea that a short-term memory store is impaired. 
One problem for this hypothesis is that their recognition memory appears to be much 
better than their spoken recall. The patients’ ability to recognize more than they could 
recall makes it difficult to disentangle some component of speech production or motor 
planning from storage, and muddies estimates of how deficient their ability to retain 
information across short delays really was. Some patients undertook whole-sequence 
matching tasks in which they heard an aural list, then heard another list and decided 
whether it was identical to the first or different by one item. We present data from this 
task taken from Warrington and Shallice’s (1969) report of KF and from a report 
including three conduction aphasics (Tzortzis & Albert, 1974) in Figure 1. Less detailed, 
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but consistent evidence also comes from two patients described by Kinsbourne (1972), 
one of whom managed 80% correct with 4-digit lists and one of whom responded 
correctly to each of three 8-digit lists, and from patient LS, who performed 85-90% 
correct on a whole-sequence matching task comprising lists of three words (Strub & 
Gardner, 1974). Referring to the data plotted in Figure 1, KF’s recognition performance 
is not only far superior to his recall performance, but not even obviously impaired. Note 
that KF is the only “pure” case of short-term memory deficiency in this set, but his 
recognition boost is, if anything, more pronounced than that of the conduction aphasics. 
Warrington and Shallice used KF’s intact performance on matching sequences of as 
many as four items to argue that KF’s auditory perception was undamaged. However, 
this sequence matching task is analogous to the recognition memory tasks widely used 
to estimate how much visual information participants can remember (e.g., Vogel, 
Woodman, & Luck, 2001; Wheeler & Treisman, 2002), and may be applied generally to 
cases in which the identification of a change in a set depends on consideration of the 
whole sequence (Rouder, Morey, Morey, & Cowan, 2011). It is thus not clear that 
patients like KF who could perform this comparison task well can be reasonably 
described as having selective damage to a short-term store.  
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 To begin to quantify the difference between recognition and recall in these 
patients using the very limited information available, we attempted to estimate the 
number of items (k) they maintained on these tasks. For the recognition data, we 
applied Pashler’s (1988) method for estimating k. For the recall data, both proportions 
of whole sequences recalled as well as proportions of items from those sequences (i.e. 
including partially correct sequences) are reported so we produced separate k estimates 
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from both. Additional details about how these estimates were derived are available in 
our supplementary materials (https://osf.io/wbmk7/). These three values for each 
patient are given in Table 1. Along with the proportions correct reported in the papers 
and reproduced in Figure 1, these values suggest that the patients, particularly KF, were 
capable of maintaining more information than their recall performance suggests. This is 
especially striking when we consider KF only attempted 4-item lists on the whole-
sequence matching task which informed our recognition-based k. Capacity estimates are 
naturally constrained by the maximum size of the set the participant attempted. Given 
the opportunity to attempt longer lists in the recognition task, KF’s k value would likely 
have been even higher. It is worth emphasizing that performance of this recognition task 
required accurate serial order memory to not reject intact sequences as changed as well 
as to identify the changed item in the list. Recall, on the other hand, poses the additional 
demand of producing the sequence. 
Ideally, we would be able to compare the performance of the patients on whole 
display matching to performance of healthy participants, but no data from comparable 
healthy participants on this exact task are available in any of the case reports (though 
some data from patients with other deficits, who performed near ceiling, are available; 
Tzortzis and Albert, 1974). One way to assess recognition failure is to compare 
performance with what would be expected if the participant were guessing (i.e., 50%). 
By this standard, most of the patients tested demonstrate memory for these lists up to at 
least 4 items (which was the maximum tested in most cases; exceptions noted above). 
Our estimates of the number of items in memory are in agreement with this 
observation; with the exception of CS1, the patients appear to retain the majority of the 
presented sequences up to 4-items long. Nevertheless, with a 50% chance of guessing 
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the correct response, it could be argued that relying on this task alone might over-
estimate patients’ memory abilities (Shallice & Warrington, 1977). However, this 
critique applies equally to the task’s use as a test of aural perception. One cannot say 
that strong performance on this task proves there was no perceptual deficiency and then 
assert that the same strong performance is uninterpretable if used to assess recognition 
memory. If we consider these patients’ performance unimpaired, we must doubt the 
extent of these patients’ memory deficiencies. If we consider performance to be 
impaired, then we must question the original interpretation of these data, which was 
that the patients’ aural perception was unimpaired. Either way, this ambiguity throws 
the idea that an aural short-term store has sustained damage into doubt.  
Shallice and Warrington (1977) re-examined recognition memory in KF and JB 
by devising a probe-recognition test in which the patients indicated whether a given 
item was present in a list or not. Using this task they report that KF made 35% errors on 
a 5-item list and that JB made 37% errors on a 6-item list. They stressed that this 
reflected abnormal recognition because these were high proportions of errors on list 
lengths below normal span. Although we have no data from a comparison control 
sample, these error rates do strike us as rather higher than would be plausible in healthy 
individuals, but this is difficult to say without appropriate comparison evidence. Two 
reports with similar (but not identical) tasks in healthy young adults provide some 
evidence of how well control participants might have performed. Morey et al. (2013) 
measured performance on a verbal cued-probe task with aurally-presented 3- and 6-
digit lists. Participants heard a digit list and later saw placeholders indicating positions 
in the list, with a digit in one of them. Their task was to say whether that digit was in 
that position. Participants performed well, but not perfectly, on 3-item lists (~3% errors 
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with the shortest measured retention interval, 4500 ms) and committed ~21% errors 
with 6-item lists. Baddeley, Chincotta, Stafford, and Turk (2002) administered whole-
sequence matching tasks with series of 5-8 short or long words. Focusing on the short-
word data (because they are more comparable to digits or letters), performance ranged 
from ~13% errors with 5-word lists to 40% errors with 8-item lists. Given the variability 
reported in these samples of healthy individuals on comparable recognition tasks, we 
cannot clearly rule out that the patients’ recognition performance lies within one 
standard deviation of that of healthy participants. These data sources are not perfect 
comparisons for KF and JB: the tasks are not exactly the same, and the healthy samples 
are of course not appropriately matched. But these data demonstrate that even healthy 
young participants commit errors on verbal recognition tasks within “normal” span 
lengths. Judging whether patients’ recognition data is as strikingly abnormal as their 
recall data is not straightforward. In light of these patients’ spectacularly poor recall of 
much shorter aural-verbal lists than they could recognize, the recognition data at least 
suggest that the patients remember more aural-verbal information than their recall 
performance indicates. Though this degree of successful recognition may be outside a 
normal range, patients’ comparative success recognizing longer lists than they could 
explicitly recall should be considered when determining the nature of their deficit, and 
evidence from matched control participants is badly needed.  
 3.3 Stimulus-based inconsistencies. Another puzzling finding from both KF 
and PV (plus some conduction aphasics; Tzortzis & Albert, 1974) is that they apparently 
show much less of an aural-verbal recall deficit when tested with digits rather than 
letters. We plotted data from KF (Warrington & Shallice, 1969), JB, WF (Warrington et 
al., 1971), and PV (Basso et al., 1982) when tested with digits and letters by mode of 
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presentation in Figure 2. This plot shows that with aural presentation, the patients 
performed substantially better when recalling digits than when recalling letters.  
FIGURE 2 HERE 
This pattern is unexpected from patients with a short-term phonological storage 
deficit for several reasons. If these patients lack access to a phonological store, then any 
kind of aural-verbal information should equally lack access. Assuming they have access 
to an impaired phonological short-term store, we presume that they can hold some 
amount of information, but assuming equal phoneme durations, they should recall the 
same number of phonemes no matter what category the phonemes are drawn from. In 
English (KF’s language), most digit and letter names are single-syllable phonemes, so 
there is no reason to assume that letters would necessarily require more space in a 
phonological short-term store than digits. However, for Italian-speaking PV, one might 
have reasonably expected the reverse: In Italian, most of the digit names are multi-
syllabic whereas Italian letter names mostly comprise only one syllable. Yet PV also 
shows an advantage for digits over letters with aural presentation, which shows that 
PV’s performance reflects more than how many phoneme units she can hold in an 
impaired phonological short-term store. A potentially important advantage of digits 
over letters in either language is that they come from a smaller set. The sensory-motor 
interpretation of these patient cases presumes that their deficit arises from a break-
down in communication between the aural perception and motor production systems, 
which can be posited without presuming that the information is ever transferred to a 
specialized short-term store (Buchsbaum et al., 2011; Buchsbaum & D’Esposito, 2008). 
Patients with this deficiency in planning responses would plausibly benefit from 
restriction of the response choice set, as healthy individuals do. 
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In light of the all of the other evidence of short-term memory deficits, it might be 
tempting to suppose that better memory for digits than letters is evidence of KF and PV 
relying on their intact long-term learning to somehow “hack” these immediate recall 
tasks (as suggested of patient IL by Saffran & Marin, 1975). While this may be plausible, 
it is unsatisfying as a unique explanation of patient’s deficient performance because 
similar patterns are also consistently observed in healthy individuals (refer to the 
literature review and original data of Jones & Macken, 2015). To demonstrate that 
patients are compensating by relying on a different memory resource, one must show 
that they perform the unusual strategy to a greater extent than healthy individuals do. 
Because we do not have appropriate comparison data to consider this, we have no 
reason to believe that these patients rely on long-term knowledge to assist aural-verbal 
recall to an unusual degree. While this pattern could probably be explained in some way 
by invoking the interaction of multiple working memory components, better recall from 
a more restricted set of choices is likewise consistent with the suggestion of a deficit in 
integrating aural perception with response planning. Though the digits > letters pattern 
does not allow us to clearly distinguish the best account of poor short-term memory 
performance, it is sufficiently consistent to be considered further in theoretical 
predictions about how a patient with a damaged memory store or a damaged ability to 
integrate sensory representations with response planning would be expected to deal 
with various sets of materials.    
While contemporary models of multiple-component working memory 
acknowledge that short- and long-term storage must interact somehow (Baddeley, 2012; 
Logie, 2011), they do not explicitly posit a clear method for how this interaction takes 
place. This specificity is needed if we are to generate predictions for how damage to a 
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phonological short-term store might affect integration of the contents of phonological 
short-term memory with long-term knowledge. KF and PV’s recall, while apparently 
deficient, still seems to operate along similar principles expected based on data from 
healthy individuals. In order to account for this normal performance pattern, long-term 
memory or response properties distinguishing digits from letters must link up with the 
phonological store. If the store is damaged, the account may also have to incorporate the 
possibility that these same memory or response properties also can link up with visual-
spatial storage in a similar manner, and to our knowledge that possibility has not been 
explored or substantiated in detail. It is possible that a multiple-component framework 
that posits a specialized verbal short-term storage system in addition to a visual short-
term storage system and capabilities to interface with long-term knowledge could 
account for these patterns, but to our knowledge there is no account of the multiple-
component system that explains how the proposed modules interact. This is necessary 
for supporting a more complex interpretation of the case evidence that goes beyond the 
claim that the observed neuropsychological patterns arise because of damage to the 
phonological store. 
3.4 Insufficient evidence for compensatory visualization strategies. It 
is a stretch for the multiple-component working memory theories to explain the 
complete patterns of evidence provided by these cases, upon which they have relied so 
heavily. According to those theories (e.g., Baddeley, 2012; Logie, 2011), both auditory 
and visual input of speech should be primarily processed by the phonological store. 
However, auditory input to that store is supposedly more automatic, whereas visual 
input supposedly makes its way into the store only with the help of covert articulation. 
Visual input of verbal memoranda can also benefit from visuo-spatial coding to some 
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degree. If it is the phonological store that is damaged and not, say, the auditory input to 
that store or the communication between auditory perception and motor planning, then 
the pattern of patient evidence can be explained only by the suggestion that patients 
lean heavily and somewhat successfully on visuo-spatial storage for printed language.  
However, the available evidence provides rather little reason to suppose that 
aural short-term memory patients cope by adopting visualization strategies, and does 
not attempt to show that patients use such strategies more than healthy individuals do. 
The representation format of a memory can be assessed by examining confusion errors 
in recall (Conrad, 1964). If letters are represented aurally and encoded in a phonological 
store, then participants should err by recalling phonologically-similar letters, whereas if 
letters are represented orthographically, they should err by recalling visually-similar 
letters. One might expect that patients with a deficient phonological short-term store 
would preferentially represent phonological information orthographically, and therefore 
show more tendency to confuse visually-similar letters than healthy participants do. 
Warrington and Shallice (1972) examined phonological and visual confusion errors in 
KF’s written recall of aurally- and visually-presented verbal sequences. They found no 
evidence that KF encoded aurally-presented letters visually, which is perfectly consistent 
with the assumption that KF had limited access to this information, and therefore 
visually-based confusions would not have been expected. With visual presentation, there 
was more evidence of visual than phonological confusion errors, but no comparable data 
from healthy control participants to attest to KF employing a visual strategy beyond 
what might be observed in healthy participants (Logie, Della Sala, Wynn, & Baddeley, 
2000; Logie, Saito, Morita, Varma, & Norris, 2016), which is crucial. We cannot 
interpret KF’s performance as reflecting compensation for impaired phonological 
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storage by relying on visual coding unless it can be shown that KF commits more visual 
confusions than a comparable healthy control participant would. Vallar and Baddeley 
(1984) showed that, unlike healthy participants, PV does not show phonological 
similarity effects with visually-presented materials. They argued that the clear absence 
of phonological similarity effects with visual presentation in PV was evidence that PV 
strategically avoided converting visual input into a phonological representation using 
her intact sub-vocal speech, thereby avoiding transferring it to the presumably deficient 
phonological store. However, there was no corresponding evidence that she maintained 
visual representations instead, which means we cannot really tell how PV used the 
hypothetical multiple-component system to cope. Altogether, these patterns confirm a 
deficit related to aural-verbal materials, but fall short of convincingly demonstrating the 
compensation that a multiple-component working memory model implies.  
In summary, the data from these patient cases does not manifestly point to a 
selective aural-verbal short-term memory deficit. Many patients evince strong 
recognition memory performance with quantities of aural-verbal stimuli beyond their 
span as measured by recall. Even if their performance were shown to be impaired 
compared to healthy controls, this suggests at least a milder aural-verbal memory deficit 
than usually supposed. The advantage for digits compared to letters, which was 
observed in KF (Warrington & Shallice, 1969), several conduction aphasics (Saffran & 
Marin, 1975; Tzortzis & Albert, 1974; Vallar & Papagno, 2002; though see also LS of 
Strub & Gardner, 1974, who performed equivalently on digits and letters), and PV 
(Basso et al., 1982) may possibly be explained in terms of damage to a short-term 
phonological store, but must be supplemented with speculation about how the other 
components help the patient to exhibit patterns of performance seen in healthy 
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individuals (i.e. digits > letters). Currently the level of specification regarding the 
interaction between components is not detailed enough to support a particular 
interpretation. Moreover, alternative explanations for these patterns have not been 
ruled out. Rather than a short-term memory deficit that has knock-on effects on word 
repetition and comprehension of complex sentences for which word order changes the 
meaning, we cannot clearly rule out the reverse possibility, namely that a subtle deficit 
of motor production or planning, or communication between auditory perception and 
motor systems is selectively impacting performance on certain aural-verbal memory 
tasks (e.g. those involving recall). In order to further distinguish these possibilities, we 
shall consider the overarching memory system in which a phonological short-term 
memory store must be situated, and consider the plausibility of a temporary 
phonological store in context.  
4. Systemic problems with the selective short-term storage assumption 
 Memories are, of course, not exclusively represented in verbal forms. Much of 
what we remember – for instance, spatial maps, the facial features of our acquaintances, 
and even the conjunctions of such non-verbal features with their verbal labels –  could 
not be maintained in an exclusively phonological short-term memory store. When we 
propose that there is a memory store exclusively for phonological information, we must 
therefore also suppose there are memory stores specialized for other sorts of 
information. The classic multiple-component model of working memory dealt with this 
by assuming a corresponding visual-spatial short-term store (Baddeley, 1986). Though 
this plausibly accounts for the capacity to remember information with phonological, 
visual, and spatial features, we might arguably need comparable structures for other 
kinds of representation.   
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Cowan’s (1999; 1988) lack of a commitment to specialized stores in his embedded 
processes model had to do with the concern that the taxonomy of stores would be 
unclear given the need for storage of such things as the locations of sounds, musical 
chords, touch sensations, smells, abstract ideas, and so on.  Cowan talked about these 
possibilities by referring to the diverse set of currently activated features within the 
long-term memory system. Cowan (1999, p. 89) added the point that, to account for 
memory of the new associations that occur within stimulus sets (e.g., the serial positions 
of items in the list 1-3-1), there is rapid, new learning in the long-term memory system 
and this newly-learned information can still be in an activated state. Accomplishing a 
similar function within a more modular approach, Baddeley (2000) amended his model 
by assuming that unaccommodated memories fall within the purview of a catch-all 
store, the episodic buffer. In Cowan’s conception, it is possible for diverse features to be 
active in long-term memory and also for a few of them to be integrated into objects in 
the focus of attention; in Baddeley’s conception, in contrast, information may be held in 
its specialized store, or possibly also in the domain-general episodic buffer. The 
multiple-component view of working memory thus requires evidence for at least 
phonological and visuo-spatial specialized stores, whereas the embedded processes view 
may accommodate domain-specificity without postulating specialized short-term stores 
at all.  
Once we commit to one specialized store, we need others; modularity constantly 
begets the need for more modules (Van Orden, Pennington, & Stone, 2001) without 
necessarily advancing explanation of how the system works as a whole. Let’s assume for 
the sake of illustration that there are verbal and visual-spatial stores, as both classic and 
contemporary multiple-component working memory models suggest, and that these are 
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sufficient for temporarily representing most features. If patients showing deficits in 
aural-verbal short-term memory provide the unassailable evidence for assuming such a 
store, and if logically assuming such a store means there must be something similar for 
visual and spatial representations, then occasionally a patient must appear showing 
intact aural-verbal short-term memory but selectively impaired visual or spatial short-
term memory. Although several cases have been nominated as demonstrating either 
selectively deficient spatial or visual short-term memory (Bonni et al., 2014; Carlesimo, 
Perri, Turriziani, Tomaiuolo, & Caltagirone, 2001; De Renzi & Nichelli, 1975; Hanley, 
Young, & Pearson, 1991; Lepore, Celentano, Conson, & Grossi, 2008; Luzzatti, Vecchi, 
Agazzi, Cesa-Bianchi, & Vergani, 1998; Ross, 1980; Wilson, Baddeley, & Young, 1999), 
none demonstrated a convincing selective impairment. Morey (2018) reviewed this 
literature in depth, and found that these patients frequently presented with additional 
cognitive deficits that could not easily be attributed to a visual or spatial short-term 
memory impairment, making it unclear whether their visual-spatial memory deficit 
must be due to selective damage to a visual-spatial short-term store. In some cases, 
close examination of the administration of the verbal, visual, and spatial memory tasks 
revealed that these tasks differed in aspects other than their stimulus modality, for 
instance, the response mode or constraints on response options. When these factors are 
controlled across presentation modalities in healthy individuals, the apparent 
differences between presentation modalities are greatly reduced (Ward, Avons, & 
Melling, 2005). Until similarly controlled procedures are adopted when comparing 
verbal with visual or spatial memory in patients, we cannot definitively diagnose the 
source of apparent dissociations in patients. This means that none of these cases present 
with the clear reverse of KF or PV’s experience. None of them, when combined with the 
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evidence of KF or PV, provide us with an unambiguous double dissociation that can only 
be attributed damage or sparing of the temporary store specialized to maintain one 
specific kind of representation. 
Possibly, as tests of visual and spatial memory become increasingly sophisticated, 
more convincing evidence from patients with selective deficits in spatial or visual 
memory will emerge. Future patients demonstrating short-term memory deficits might 
be tested even more extensively, and the results of these tests could eventually bolster 
hypotheses about specialized temporary stores. However, the logical problems created 
by assuming this modularity of function will remain. Acknowledging that short-term 
stores for verbal and visual-spatial maintenance are not sufficient, Baddeley (2000) now 
also includes amodal storage in the working memory model. Competing models of 
working memory also typically include some provision for amodal storage (Barrouillet & 
Camos, 2015; Cowan, 2005; Oberauer, 2013). If everyone assumes there is amodal 
temporary storage alongside domain-specific temporary storage, then double 
dissociations based on the presumed domain of the representation become impossible 
to interpret clearly. We would be unable to tell whether the component that seems to be 
intact is a domain-specific store specialized for holding the sort of information that the 
patient can recall, or whether the patient is relying on the amodal resource. Extensive 
testing with many kinds of materials targeting maintenance versus other processes 
would be needed to try to tease apart these possibilities. These problems multiply when 
we consider whether the functions in question belong to the memory system, the 
language system, or a perceptual system. At some point, we must consider whether such 
clearly interdependent activities like temporary memory for speech, aural perception, 
and planning output are related, how they may be related, and what redundancies there 
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may be in the separate frameworks we use to describe perception, language and 
memory. 
Finally, others have noted that the loci of lesions that lead to auditory short-term 
memory impairments are inconsistent across patients (Buchsbaum & D’Esposito, 2008; 
Gordon, 1983). Of course, it could be the case that the precise locus of a phonological 
store differs per individual, or that in fact the construct of a phonological store is 
distributed across the brain. However, labeling a particular set of processes or 
phenomena a “store” implies certain properties which can be tested. For instance, the 
region or network of regions that we call a “store” should be exclusively used for storage 
of whatever sort of material it is meant to store, and should be in use during the 
retention period over which the material is demonstrably maintained. Buchsbaum and 
D’Esposito demonstrate that the most plausible overlapping loci for a phonological 
short-term store in healthy individuals are compromised because the same loci have 
been shown to be involved with storage of non-verbal information, or even with 
functions other than storage. If the regions reflecting a “store” do not behave 
consistently with our assumptions about what stores do, then it make sense to re-
consider our assumptions. It is clearly problematic for the specialized store idea that no 
region or network of regions can yet be pinpointed that is both uniquely for temporary 
storage and also uniquely for representing information in a particular format.  
In summary, suggesting that these patients’ poor aural-verbal recall reflects a 
damaged aural-verbal short-term memory store presents as many puzzles as supposing 
that the defect to recall relates to a specific impairment of the language system, or the 
integration of aural perception with the planning of motor output. Even if we were to 
accept that the evidence demands a specialized aural-verbal short-term memory store, 
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there has been no unambiguous double dissociation in which other patients show the 
reverse deficits with visual or spatial information without also presenting with unrelated 
difficulties. Furthermore, now that it is widely acknowledged that working memory 
includes domain-general storage, all of these apparent double dissociations must be 
reconsidered, because we can no longer map intact performance to a particular module. 
Positing more than two modular, specialized short-term memory stores demands 
parallel chains of evidence that have not yet emerged. The multiple-component models 
of working memory that have traditionally guided interpretation of these cases are 
challenged by models that can also account for the experimental evidence, and that 
allow the possibility of  incorporating domain-specificity via systems other than short-
term memory. Because the extant patient evidence may be interpreted in several distinct 
ways, this evidence does not yet compel models of working memory to include 
specialized short-term stores. We must acknowledge that we cannot measure memory in 
a perfect vacuum, and assume that measurements of memory always also depend on 
related systems. Whatever components or processes we assume, we must consider how 
much they overlap with the components of other cognitive systems. 
5. Sensory-motor integration and modality-specific effects within an 
amodal working memory  
Though backed up by considerable evidence (Buchsbaum et al., 2011; Buchsbaum 
& D’Esposito, 2008; D’Esposito & Postle, 2015), the sensory-motor integration account 
of short-term memory patient cases (and the sensory-motor recruitment interpretation 
of cognitive neuroscience evidence more generally) lacks the compelling simplicity and 
vividness of the classic multiple-component working memory model’s temporary stores. 
However, we think that in combination with an amodal attentional view of the working 
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memory system, the sensory-motor integration account may be better fleshed out, and 
may ultimately prove to explain benchmark findings more thoroughly than the 
traditional multiple-component model. The embedded process model of working 
memory (Cowan, 2005) focuses on describing the amodal core of the working memory 
system, which presumably causes the persistent capacity limits observed both within 
and across stimulus domains (Cowan, 2001). The embedded process model posits that 
some memories are maintained at a heightened level of activation, including newly-
learned episodic information. Although any number of features can be concurrently 
activated according to the theory, only a small number of them can be integrated 
together and concurrently held as objects, ideas, or events in the focus of attention. The 
activated features can come from environmental input including semantic features of 
attended events and sensory features of all events. They can also come from long-term 
memory through associative processing, or from items recently but no longer in the 
focus of attention. Importantly, there is no explicit requirement that the activated 
features be represented in a short-term store. 
The sensory-motor integration account supposes that specialized perceptual and 
motor regions support memory functions, and indeed bring about the robust and 
consistent phenomena that classically distinguish “short-term” from “long-term” 
memories. This explanation is supported by evidence that overlapping regions and 
networks become active during memory, perception and, in some cases, motor 
performance (e.g., D’Esposito & Postle, 2015). In particular, there is a multivoxel 
pattern signature of specific activated items when they are needed for the current task 
(i.e., when they are in the focus of attention), with the activation occurring in the same 
general regions that process the information perceptually: primarily temporal cortex for 
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verbal items, occipital cortex for visual items, and with different specific subregions and 
patterns for bars, faces, words, etc. However, these regions subserve functions besides 
storage, and the activation associated with a specific type of item need not be continuous 
for successful memory retrieval to occur (Lewis-Peacock, et al. 2016), which makes them 
implausible substrates for specialized short-term memory stores. There is also a frontal-
parietal network that includes activation in the intraparietal sulcus reflecting how many 
items are currently actively in focus, not containing a copy of the information per se but 
linking to each item as a hub with pointers to the items (Cowan et al., 2011; Lewis-
Peacock, Drysdale, Oberauer, & Postle, 2012; Li, Christ, & Cowan, 2014; Majerus et al., 
2016; Todd & Marois, 2004; Xu & Chun, 2006). The sensory-motor integration account 
of short-term memory phenomena is thus compatible with amodal models of working 
memory like the embedded process model (Cowan, 2005).  In terms of the embedded 
processes model (Cowan, 1988, 1999, 2005), the activation of the information in cortical 
perceptual processing regions corresponds to the activated portion of long-term 
memory, and the indices of these objects in the intraparietal sulcus presumably form the 
core of the focus of attention.  
This neural activation evidence helps to restrict what is encompassed in the 
breadth of activated long-term memory, suggesting that it need not encompass 
specialized temporary stores. In order to map the embedded process model onto the 
multiple component model of working memory, activated long-term memory could be 
allowed to include the contents of specialized short-term stores (Cowan, 1995; Cowan et 
al., 2014; Rhodes & Cowan, 2018). But one could instead consider activated long-term 
memories to include fleeting representations temporarily preserved by perceptual 
systems and information kept active by motor re-instantiation. Sensory-motor 
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recruitment makes it unnecessary to impose dedicated, specialized short-term “slave” 
systems into the embedded process framework’s activated memories: the activation of 
perceptual and motor systems can serve the memory system without creating 
redundancy. 
One important complexity in the sensory-motor view that is not found in the 
multiple-component view is that it should be expected that representation quality is a 
combination of sensory-motor channels. For example, the printed word “smooth” relies 
on visual and orthographic analyses at first, phonological analysis derived from original 
acoustic experience, and a semantic analysis that comes from tactile experience. All of 
these feature types could serve as bases for working memory retention but also could 
serve as bases for confusions between stimuli. Multiple-component theorists agree that 
more than one store could hold an item (e.g., see Logie et al., 2000, indicating that there 
are not only phonological but also visual confusions between words) but the limited 
number of stores in multiple-component models cannot provide the richness of 
available sensory-motor processors. Further, there is the important open question for 
multiple-component theorists to address, namely how different storage components 
interact and pool their efforts to produce observed responses, which we raised earlier. 
 Allowing that an amodal working memory inherits such complexity from the 
sensory and motor systems themselves, without the further abstraction assumed when 
these signals are presumed to be converted to the contents of a specialized short-term 
memory store, also provides a path toward explaining modality-specific effects in short-
term memory without resorting only to feature-based interference (which may occur 
across modalities, but is likely to be more prevalent when trying to remember 
information within a modality; see Oberauer, et al., 2016 for a description of this 
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possibility). The evidence provided by patients with selectively deficient aural-verbal 
recall cannot be elegantly explained by the general principle of feature-based 
interference, given their access to more information when probed via recognition 
Incorporating the ideas of sensory-motor integration into the embedded processes 
approach allows the amodal storage system to express more domain specificity than 
feature-based interference allows. According to this view, the deficit of these patients is 
not in the storage of aural-verbal features, but in the translation of these sustained 
representations into a motor response. Applied more generally, we must presume that at 
least some of the robust, modality-specific phenomena observed in immediate memory 
tasks occurs because modality-specific limitations and benefits for various stimuli are 
inherited by working memory from activations of the sensory and motor systems; their 
very activation in these systems enables them to be recruited by the working memory 
system. We think that the patient evidence casts doubt on the idea that interference 
from overlapping or confusable features can fully account for the modality-specific 
phenomena observed in immediate memory, even though we also think the patient 
evidence falls short of unambiguously supporting modular short-term memory stores.  
Another reason to prefer an amodal memory system that inherits the 
specializations of other systems over a dedicated multiple-component working memory 
system is that it neatly leads to explanations for why measured capacities of different 
kinds of information differ so drastically. Measured capacities for readily verbalizable 
the information (e.g., letters, digits, words, nameable pictures) are consistently higher 
than capacities for visual or tonal information (e.g., Vergauwe et al., 2010) even when 
the visual memory task does not require memory for serial order (C. Morey, Morey, van 
der Reijden, & Holweg, 2013; Saults & Cowan, 2007), which may not be well-preserved 
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by the proposed visual-spatial short-term memory system (Logie, 1995). Strikingly, 
Vergauwe et al. (2010) observed higher spans for verbal materials even when 
accompanied by a high verbal cognitive load than they observed for spatial memoranda 
under the lowest cognitive load (whether verbal or spatial). Moreover, memories for 
verbalizable information are more resistant to interference (Morey & Mall, 2012; Morey 
et al., 2013) than comparable visual-spatial memories, even when the to-be-
remembered verbal information is unfamiliar and not likely part of long-term 
knowledge (Morey & Miron, 2016). These memory phenomena mirror sensation 
phenomena: aural sensory memories persist longer than visual sensory memories 
(Cowan, 1988; Sperling, 1960), and there is no motor system for reproducing and 
communicating visual sensory information comparable to the language system, which 
can reproduce verbal information with high fidelity via speech. To account for these 
findings via dedicated short-term memory stores, one would need to specify a visual 
short-term memory system with a smaller capacity or limited precision, or explicitly 
restricted means for re-activating visual representations (or perhaps suggest that there 
is no specialized way to re-activate visual representations while there is a specialized 
way to reactive verbal information, as Barrouillet and Camos make explicit in their 2015 
time-based resource sharing model), not one in which the dedicated visual short-term 
memory system includes storage and rehearsal components comparable to those of the 
verbal system (Logie et al., 2016). An advantage of assuming that an amodal memory 
system co-opts processes from other systems lies in its avoidance of redundancy across 
psychological phenomena. Because the perceptual and motor systems supporting verbal 
information versus abstract visual information differ, disparities in memory for these 
types of information can be better anticipated. 
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To reconcile an amodal account with neuropsychological deficits, Cowan (1988, 
p. 182), proposed that it is the control processes needed specifically for short-term 
memory that are damaged in patients with deficient short-term memory and preserved 
long-term memory. If these control processes are considered to apply to any short-term 
retention task, including recognition as well as recall, the evidence noted above of 
relatively preserved recognition would seem to contradict this alternative solution. 
However, some other interpretations of these control processes might make Cowan’s 
suggestion indistinguishable from the sensory-motor account.   
6. Concluding comments 
There is a temptation to suggest that calling an immediate memory deficit a 
consequence of sensory-motor integration rather than selective damage to a short-term 
store is merely attaching a different name to the problem, which may do nothing to 
forward our understanding of the deficit or of memory system functioning more broadly 
(Shallice & Warrington, 1977). However, we think that reconsidering the source of the 
deficiency in these patients and acknowledging that the deficiency may not reflect 
damage to a dedicated memory system constitutes an important step forward in 
working memory theory. Theoretical debates in working memory are characterized by a 
constant tension between specialization and generality. A fundamental conundrum lies 
in how best to simultaneously explain two robust but apparently contradictory findings: 
1) greater interference is observed between two tasks that involve representing 
information from the same modality than from representing information from different 
modalities (e.g., Fougnie & Marois, 2011; Logie, Zucco, & Baddeley, 1990), yet 2) dual-
task costs are observed even across modalities (Cowan & Morey, 2007; C. Morey et al., 
2013; Vergauwe et al., 2010). Working memory is meant to describe the system that 
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integrates perceived information with long-term knowledge, and allows for the 
manipulation and transformation of memories. It is, by definition, a characterization of 
the junction of many functions, and must naturally incorporate their respective benefits 
and limitations.  
We think that the evidence from aural-verbal short-term memory cases includes 
several clues that these patients’ memories may function in some respects like a healthy 
individual’s. These patients perform much better on recognition-based whole-sequence 
matching tasks than on recall tasks. They consistently perform better with information 
drawn from a more restricted set (e.g., digits rather than letters). Though PV shows poor 
memory for late-list items when recalling in serial order, she can recall the most recently 
presented items well if instructed to recall them first (Vallar & Papagno, 1986). These 
findings are not clearly predicted by the proposal that these rare patients simply 
represent less information in their damaged phonological short-term stores. By 
supposing that their impairments prevent normal sensory-motor integration from 
occurring but that a central, amodal memory system that draws upon sensory memories 
and motor affordances remains intact, we can explain their poor immediate recall 
performance by supposing that the memory system cannot commandeer one ancillary 
function which in healthy individuals boosts measured capacity. 
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Table 1. Estimates of patients’ capacity (k) based on their recognition and recall data. 
 
   Recognition k Sequence-correct k Items-correct k  
Case             
 KF  3.00   1.80   1.30 
 CS1  1.00   0.94   0.92 
 CS2  3.00   2.77   1.82 
 CS3  3.00   2.84   2.45    
Note.  Details about how estimates were calculated are available online 
(https://osf.io/wbmk7/). 
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Proportions list-wise accuracy on spoken serial recall and whole-sequence 
recognition tasks with auditory stimulus presentation for KF (Warrington & Shallice, 
1969, Tables 1-3) and three conduction aphasics (Tzortzis & Albert, 1974, Tables 1 and 
6). Data include trials with digits, letters, and words as stimuli. Error bars are standard 
errors of the mean.   
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Figure 2 
 
 
Figure 2. Proportions of lists recalled correctly (with standard errors of the mean) for 
patients JB, KF, PV, and WH with auditory and visual presentation, organized by list 
length and type of verbal material. Data for KF were taken from Warrington and Shallice 
(1969, Tables 1 and the 1-second presentation rate portion of Table 2); for JB and WH 
from Warrington, et al. (1971, Table 4 on p. 383) and for PV from Basso et al. (1982, 
Table 1). 
